Dynamics That Define the Strategic Importance of Niger and Chad to Great and Emerging Powers

By Fidel Amakye Owusu

1. Yesterday, the US announced the completion of the withdrawal of its forces and equipment from Niger. This has been months after it officially announced its exit.

2. At the same time, Hungary has asked for its share of EU peace funds to be redirected to “Chad’s security”. This is after the Central European country has pledged the deployment of 200 troops in the landlocked country.

3. Earlier, the US made it official that it was leaving Chad. This happened before the elections that metamorphosed the current government from a military-led one into a “civilian” one. Some credible sources insist the US might go back to the country.

4. Also, some Gulf States have shown peculiar interest in Chad. Iran has also made significant moves toward Niger in recent months. These add to the significant Chinese presence in the oil sectors of both countries.

5. And so what?

6. While the diverse attention to these two countries is due to multiple factors including their sheer sizes, location in transitional zones, huge natural resources, and intricate demographics, some dynamics are often overlooked and are critical to understanding them.

7. What are these?

8. Currently, the actors that are interested in these countries can be categorised into three: security actors with goals other than regime protection, regime protectors and those seeking solely economic interest. Even though this categorization is not cast in stone and may overlap, it could help understand the current dynamics.

9. Firstly, the ruling governments in the two states are among the most paranoid in the region and have reasons to feel so. The current Chadian leader’s father was killed on the battlefield while engaging rebels. He has a lot to be “scared” of. Also, the junta in Niger, since its early days in power, has been occupied with countering moves to get it out.

10. Consequently, these regimes prioritize their survival and are more likely to cooperate with partners that offer regime protection. This makes those who pursue other security goals other than regime protection, less desirable.

11. In the current scheme of things, Wagner and other PMCs look more attractive to these governments than other security partners who will not overlook the excesses and human rights violations. It’s not about the people, it’s about the regimes.

12. A critical look at Hungary’s aim (despite its argument that some military presence in Chad could help address the migration problem) seems to be an attempt to support the regime protection goals of the landlocked country.

13. While the economic reward could be huge in the form of natural resources, there is no easy route in the region.

14. Any “help” should be people-centred.